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COBRA: AN INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
Thomas H. Somers*
While Americans spend more of their income on health care
than the people of any other country, their health-measured in the
broad terms of life span and death rates-is not outstanding. It
ranks somewhere around average among the world's industrial de-
mocracies. By one extremely important test, infant mortality, it is
far below average. Some of the reasons for this mediocre showing
have to do with the ways Americans eat, drink, use drugs, drive
and, in general, choose to live. But some have a great deal to do
with access to medical care.'
I. LEGISLATING SOCIAL POLICY THROUGH WORKPLACE REGULATION
That the United States needs a system that provides cradle to grave access
to basic health care is not a new proposition. An early champion of national
health insurance was President Harry S Truman, who wrote:
I have never been able to understand all the fuss some people
make about government wanting to do something to improve and
protect the health of the people. I usually find that those who are
loudest in protesting against medical help by the federal govern-
ment are those who do not need help. But the fact is that a large
portion of our population cannot afford to pay for proper medical
and hospital care.2
Today, the bridge to health care for nearly forty million Americans denied
access is free or, at least affordable, health insurance.' There is no dispute
that the private sector, the federal government and virtually all states have
failed to provide universal health care access.
* Associate, Zwerdling, Paul, Leibig, Kahn & Thompson, P.C., Washington, D.C.
1. The Washington Post, August 8, 1988, at A12, col. 1.
2. H.S TRUMAN, YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 17 (1956). Truman proposed a five point
national health plan: (1) Prepayment of medical costs through compulsory insurance premi-
ums and the general revenues; (2) Protection against loss of wages from sickness and disability;
(3) Expansion of public health, maternal and child health services; (4) Federal aid to medical
schools and for research purposes; (5) Stepped-up construction of hospitals, clinics, and medi-
cal institutions under local administration. Id. at 19-21.
3. The Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1988, at A14, col. 1.
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The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) was
signed into law by President Reagan on April 7, 1986. COBRA amends,
inter alia, the Public Health Service Act (PHSA),5 the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),6 and the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC),7 mandating that employer-provided group medical plans furnish em-
ployees, their spouses and their dependent children an option for continuing
coverage in certain enumerated circumstances. While Congress and the
President, through COBRA, made the minimal policy commitment to pro-
vide a health coverage option to those who might otherwise suffer a tempo-
rary lapse of health coverage, there is no public commitment to finance this
option; the entire scheme is privately funded through the premium payments
of those electing the coverage.' Moreover, COBRA applies only to those
who already have health insurance; it does nothing for those without
coverage.
The President and the political bureaucracy have, perhaps to the surprise
of some, centralized control and regulation of the employment relationship
during the better part of the last decade. Despite widely accepted assump-
tions that "conservative Republican administrations favor corporate
volunteerism, marketplace labor policy, and the exclusion of governmental
workplace intervention," 9 it was during Ronald Reagan's watch that govern-
4. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986). COBRA is not the first federal effort to regulate employee welfare
benefit plans which are, for federal regulatory purposes, distinct from benefit plans which pro-
vide for pensions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(B) (1982). The kind of benefits which a "welfare
plan" might provide include: "medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice-
ship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal serv-
ices." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(l)(A).
By enacting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1982), Congress sought to secure employee welfare benefits through a codification of
historical common law fiduciary duties. Prior to ERISA, employee rights in health and wel-
fare plans were protected, if at all, through traditional trust and contract principles. See gener-
ally Note, Employee Benefits Law: Securing Employee Welfare Benefits Through ERISA, 61
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 551 (1986). Prior to the enactment of ERISA, and currently, Taft-
Hartley health and welfare trusts are regulated under the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) and, like any other collectively bargained right, are protected under federal labor
law. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 185-86 (1982).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
8. The cost of COBRA coverage is borne by those "qualified beneficiaries" who have
elected continuing coverage in a timely manner. ERISA §§ 602(3)& 604; IRC §§ 162
(k)(2)(C) & 162(k)(4); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(3) (1988 West Supp.).
9. Leibig, The Deprivitization of Employee Benefit and Labor Law: The Surprising Con-
servative Erosion of Trusts and of the Competitive Labor Model, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
183 (1986).
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ment, through COBRA, engineered an incremental and complex regulatory
approach to facilitate affordable access to health care."0
Legislating social programs through workplace regulation is a well-ac-
cepted pattern in this century and COBRA merely follows in step with the
trend." This increasing federal tendency toward centralizing and control-
ling employment and its benefits, for better or worse, displaces freedom of
contract in the workplace. 2 It is now commonplace for Congress to regu-
late working conditions. Indeed, at the time of this writing, Congress was
considering manifold schemes designed to promote social and economic re-
form through workplace regulation. These proposals include new pension
reform, mandated health benefits,' 3 catastrophic health insurance, pension
10. Despite President Reagan's imprimatur, mandated health benefits programs such as
COBRA are typically attacked by those on the political right as "socialized medicine pure and
simple." See, e.g., The Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1988, at A14, col. 5. It is mystifying that
the right wing did not level a similar attack on COBRA. Suffice it to say that Harry Truman's
response to those who opposed his national health care proposals forty years ago still fits
today.
But I had no patience with the reactionary selfish people and politicians who fought
year after year every proposal we made to improve the people's health. I have had
some bitter disappointments as President, but the one that has troubled me most, in a
personal way, has been the failure to defeat the organized opposition to a national
compulsory health-insurance program. But this opposition has only delayed and
cannot stop the adoption of an indispensible federal health-insurance plan.
TRUMAN, supra note 2, at 23.
11. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 210 (1982); National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1982); Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621
(1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1982).
12. Leibig, supra note 9, at 184. This trend, of course, obviates the traditional role of a
collective bargaining representative and thus undermines the power of unions and further er-
odes the principle of freedom of contract. "Freedom of Contract" is an express goal of federal
labor policy as embodied in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(d) (1982); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) ("The theory of
the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is
likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which
the Act in itself does not attempt to compel."). See also Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629-30 (1943). More recent exam-
ples of federal intrusion into the workplace include the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.)
890 (requiring, inter alia, sixty days notice to employees in advance of a plant closing) and the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 347, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 646 (curtailing employer-sponsored use of mechanical lie detector
tests).
13. The most comprehensive mandated health coverage measure under consideration at
the time of this writing is the Kennedy-Waxman Bill which, if enacted, would amend the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and require private
and public employers to provide each employee with minimum health benefits. S. 1265, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). Under Kennedy-Waxman, employers would bear eighty percent of the
cost of the benefit premium with employees absorbing the remaining cost. Id. at Sec. 314(b).
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portability, a long overdue increase in the minimum wage, parental and
medical leave. 4
Of course, there are reasons that the employment relationship holds such
allure for federal regulators. We are a nation of employees. Hence, regulat-
ing employment is an effective method of tinkering with economic and social
reform without the accompanying commitment of substantial public
financing.
We have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most our people have be-
come completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs
they lose every resource except for the relief supplied by the vari-
ous forms of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the
people upon others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another man's
hands."5
II. COBRA: A "MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT" ENACTMENT?
By enacting COBRA without deliberation and in the process amending
three distinct statutes, Congress invited a fair amount of regulatory confu-
sion and bureaucratic tension. The Departments of Treasury, Labor and
Health and Human Services are charged with issuing regulations to guide
private and public employers, plan administrators and employees in the se-
lection of COBRA coverage. 6 Only the Treasury Department has issued
temporary regulations at the time of this writing, exposing the statute's in-
artful drafting and making health plan administration nightmarish.17 A
plan administrator of a major health and welfare trust recently observed,
Employers of "low income employees" (those making $4.19 per hour or less in 1988) would be
required to finance the entire cost of those employees' benefits. Id.
14. See Ray & Brown, Federal Legislation Update October-December 1988, 4 THE LABOR
LAWYER 331 (1988).
15. F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951).
16. ERISA 29 U.S.C.A. § 1168 (West Supp. 1988); IRC § 162(k)(6); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300bb-6 (West Supp. 1988). See also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 563
(1985).
17. See 52 Fed. Reg. 22,716 (1987) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1)(proposed June 15,
1987). Plan administrators are given some flexibility until the time when Final Treasury and
Labor Department regulations are promulgated. Until that time, employers will be protected
from the potentially devastating tax consequences of non-compliance simply by complying
with the proposed regulations. Id. at 22,716-17. While the Department of Labor has yet to
issue regulations defining the myriad notice obligations imposed by COBRA, a model notice
has issued to assist employers to notify covered employees and their spouses. Use of the model
notice demonstrates good faith compliance with a reasonable interpretation of the notice re-
quirements if the notice is furnished to each covered employee at his or her last known ad-
dress. If the employee and spouse have the same address, a single mailing, addressed to both
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"We spend enormous amounts of money and the fruits [of COBRA] are
nearly non-existent."
1 8
Absent solid statutory or regulatory guidance or a legislative history that
unravels COBRA's complexity, one commentator has asked whether CO-
BRA was rashly considered, a "middle of the night" addition to the budget
reconciliation act.' 9 Indeed, some might argue that COBRA is symptomatic
of Congress' growing inclination to delegate unlimited legislative authority
to the other branches of government.2° The absence of legislative direction,
of course, is where federal agencies and, inevitably, the courts are often
called upon to divine legislative will.2 We should expect much of the same
in COBRA's future.22
will also be considered good faith compliance. Department of Labor ERISA Technical Release
No. 86-2, June 26, 1986. See also Pens. Plan Guide (CCH) I 6999C (June 5, 1987).
18. 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 875 (May 30, 1988). John J. Fleming, administrative director of
the Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers and Industry International Health Benefits
and Pension Funds, stated that from October 1987 until mid-May 1988 the fund sent out 5,910
letters to participants involved in a COBRA qualifying event. Of the employees who returned
an election form, 47 elected coverage and are paying premiums, 23 made one payment and are
now delinquent, and 18 elected coverage but never sent in a payment. Id.
19. 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 1185 (July 25, 1988). There is some evidence, besides the stat-
ute itself, which suggests that the enactment of COBRA "was a confused process in which
there probably was not sufficient forethought on penalties and details..." Id.
20. Chief Justice Rehnquist scolded Congress for failing to provide an intelligible princi-
ple to guide the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in formulating workplace
health standards for permissible levels of benzene. Accurately noting that Congress alone is
the appropriate body for many difficult social policy choices, then Justice Rehnquist quoted
John Locke:
[t]he power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary
grant and institution, can be no other that what that positive grant conveyed, which
being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no
power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.
Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 672-73 (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring) quoting LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, IN THE
TRADITION OF FREEDOM 244 (Mayer ed. 1957).
21. At the time of this writing there is virtually no reported litigation under the mandated
health benefits sections of COBRA. See, e.g., Fort Frye Teachers Association v. Board of
Education, No. C2-87-1326 (E.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 1987) (holding that a teachers strike was a
"qualifying event" and ordering the employer to offer continuation coverage). For a discus-
sion of labor stoppages as qualifying events and the implications, if any, this determination
may have for labor relations see Grate, COBRA's Requirements for Group Health Plans: Do
They Apply in a Strike?, 4 LAB. LAW. 35 (1988).
The federal government is not alone in mandating employer sponsored health benefits. Sev-
eral states have enacted or are considering mandated health coverage legislation raising the
question, beyond the scope of this Comment, of whether COBRA and ERISA preempt those
state laws. See Howard, The Terminated Employee's Right To Continue Group Health Insur-
ance, 17 COLO. LAW. 53, 55-56 (1988); 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 697 (Apr. 25, 1988); Id. at 880
(May 30, 1988).
22. The associate director of the Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations Division
of the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Chief Counsel, which is responsible for developing a
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COBRA is not an example of legislative legerdemain, but it does set forth
some coherent rules which, at this juncture, are worthy of scrutiny. Those
scattered tea leaves found in COBRA's legislative history provide a useful
synopsis of the Act, a fitting point of departure.
This provision would permit certain individuals who might other-
wise lose health insurance coverage to continue employment-based
health insurance coverage at group rates if they are willing to pay
both the normal employer and the employee premium or premium
equivalent for such coverage. By creating no additional cost for
the federal government or employers, this provision would be of
great potential benefit to people who lose group-employment based
health insurance, since individual health insurance is typically
more costly than group insurance and may be impossible to obtain
for people with pre-existing [sic] health problems.2 3
This proposal would require employers to offer the opportunity
to purchase group coverage to three categories of people: (1) laid-
off workers and their families; (2) divorcees, widows and their chil-
dren who have lost employment-based health insurance coverage
as the result of the death of an employed spouse or divorce; and
(3) spouses who have lost group coverage as a result of the covered
family member becoming eligible for Medicare while the spouse
becomes ineligible.
Laid-off workers and their families could continue group cover-
age for up to 18 months; widows, divorcees, their minor depen-
dents, and Medicare-ineligible spouses could continue coverage for
up to three years.24
III. COBRA'S SCOPE: WHO MUST COMPLY AND WHEN?
COBRA's rules apply to "any group health plan" maintained by an em-
ployer.25 A "group health plan" is any plan maintained by an employer to
provide medical care to the employer's employees, former employees and/or
large body of COBRA regulations, has stated that many COBRA rules will simply have to be
created in litigation. For example, "in the mergers and acquisitions arena, the COBRA rules
become even more frustrating, particularly in determining whether in the context of a merger
or acquisition the new or acquiring entity is liable for providing COBRA rights to the target
company's former employees." 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 885 (May 30, 1988).
23. It is unlawful for the plan to condition the availability of COBRA coverage upon
evidence of insurability. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(4) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162
(k)(2)(D) (West Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(4) (West Supp. 1988).
24. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985, S. Rep. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 42, 412.
25. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(i)(3) (West Supp.
1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,720 (Q & A 7(a)). Public employee plan participants
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their families.26 A "group health plan" is any medical reimbursement plan,
including dental and cafeteria plans whether insured, self-insured, funded or
unfunded.27 A "group health plan" includes individual and group insurance
policies, if two or more employees are involved, and employee-pay-all-plans
"if coverage under the plan would not be available at the same cost to an
employee in the event that he or she were not employed by the employer." '28
Church plans and small employer plans are exempt from COBRA. 29 A
small employer plan is one maintained exclusively by an employer in a calen-
dar year "normally" employing fewer than twenty employees, including
owners, partners, directors and independent contractors, if they are eligible
for plan coverage.3 ° COBRA is applicable to cafeteria plans and other flexi-
ble benefit arrangements, including medical reimbursement accounts, but
continuation rights apply only to the health benefit options under those
plans.3 1
and beneficiaries may also enjoy a COBRA option. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-l(a) (West Supp.
1988).
26. Id.
27. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,720 (Q & A 7(a)); See also JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSOLIDATED OMNIBUS
BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (Apr. 25, 1986).
28. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,720 (Q & A 7(a)). The regulations define "medical
care" conterminously with the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 213(d) (West Supp.
1988). Medical care includes the "diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of dis-
eases, and any other undertaking for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body" excluding general fitness programs and programs designed merely to enhance well-be-
ing. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,720 (Q & A 7). Thus, life insurance and disability
income programs need not be offered in COBRA coverage. Neither are spas and exercise
programs, accessible for purposes other than for the relief of health or medical programs,
regulated by COBRA. Id. Expressly included under the proposed regulations are those plans
such as drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs "intended to relieve or alleviate a physical
condition or health problem" whether chronic or acute. Id. at 7(c).
29. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161(b) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(2)(B) & 106(b)(2) (West
Supp. 1988).
30. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,723 (Q & A 9(a)). An employer is considered
normally employing fewer than twenty employees during a calendar year only if it had fewer
than twenty employees on at least fifty percent of its working days. Id. (Q & A 9(b)).
31. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,723 (Q & A 14). At the time of this writing virtu-
ally all employer sponsored group health plans within the definition of COBRA were subject
to the continuation coverage rules. Non-collectively bargained plans were required to comply
on the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after July 1, 1986. See COBRA
§ 10003(b)(1); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,722 (Q & A 1 l(a)). Collectively bargained
plans are required to comply as of the first day of the first plan year beginning on or after the
later of (1) January 1, 1987, or (2) the date on which the last of the collective bargaining
agreements terminates. See COBRA § 10003(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 222, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
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IV. QUALIFYING FOR COBRA COVERAGE
"Qualified Beneficiaries" and "Qualifying Events"
A "qualified beneficiary" is one who is entitled to COBRA continuation
coverage upon the occurrence of a "qualifying event." A "qualified benefici-
ary" is any person who, on the day before the "qualifying event," is covered
under an employer sponsored group health plan as an employee or an em-
ployee's spouse or dependent.32 The group of qualified beneficiaries is closed
on the day before the qualifying event.33 Accordingly, unless the plan offers
family coverage, those joining the family of a qualified beneficiary after that
day, such as newborns, adopted children and new spouses, are ineligible for
COBRA benefits.34
As noted earlier, COBRA coverage rules require offering an employee or
qualified beneficiary with a continuation coverage option on the occurrence
of a "qualifying event. ' ' 35 A qualifying event is, with respect to any covered
employee, any of the following events if, under the terms 'of the plan, the
event causes the employee, his or her spouse, or a dependent child of the
employee to lose coverage under the plan:
(1) Termination of employment or reduction in hours for any rea-
son other than for the gross misconduct of the employee;36
(2) Divorce or legal separation; 37
32. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1167(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C § 162(k)(7)(B); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300bb-8(3) (West Supp. 1988). COBRA continuation coverage is available to the "em-
ployee" covered by the health plan in the event he or she loses coverage due to termination or a
reduction in hours. Employer sponsored health plans and trust funds typically provide for an
automatic termination of benefits upon separation from service and, at times, when an em-
ployee is reduced to part-time status.
An "employee" entitled to elect coverage may include a retiree or a former employee cov-
ered on the day before a "qualifying event" by virtue of his or her previous employment. 52
Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,724 (Q & A 16). An "employee" may also include sole propri-
etors, partners, directors, independent contractors if they were covered under the plan because
of employment and as long as at least one common-law employee of the employer is also
covered under the plan. Id.
33. Id. (Q & A 17(a)).
34. Id. There are occasions when newborns, adopted children and spouses that join the
family of a qualified beneficiary become eligible for COBRA coverage. See 52 Fed. Reg., supra
note 17, at 22,728 (Q & A 30(c) & (Q & A 31).
35. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163 (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb
-3 (West Supp. 1988).
36. Thus, retirement, strikes, lockouts, layoff and discharge (except by reason of the em-
ployee's own "gross misconduct") are all events qualifying the employee, his spouse or depen-
dent children for the COBRA coverage option. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163(2) (West Supp. 1988); 52
Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q & A 18-19).
37. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(3)(c) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb3(3) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q
& A 18(b)).
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(3) Death of the employee;3 8
(4) Employee's entitlement to Medicare; 39
(5) A dependent losing dependency status under the terms of the
plan.4°
An event that would otherwise create COBRA coverage eligibility will not
rise to the level of a qualifying event if it occurs before COBRA's effective
date, or while the plan is excepted from Title X of the Act. Thus, the event
is non-qualifying on occasions when the individual's plan coverage does not
terminate until a time when COBRA does apply.41
Multiple qualifying events are instances when the otherwise straightfor-
ward rules governing qualification give way. Multiple qualifying events can
extend the period of qualification for continuation coverage from eighteen
months to thirty-six months.42
V. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
COBRA's notice requirements impose perhaps the most onerous adminis-
trative burden on employers, plan administrators and in some instances, em-
38. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163(1) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(3)(A) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-3(1); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q & A 18(b)(1)).
39. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163(4) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(3)(D) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-3 (4) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q
& A 18(a)).
40. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163(5) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(3)(E) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-3(5) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q &
A 18(a)).
41. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q & A 20-21). An example of this is if the
plan is a small-employer plan at the time of the event as the proposed regulations illustrate:
An event that occurs while a group health plan is excepted from COBRA [fails to]
... provide COBRA election rights to anyone whose coverage ends as a result of
such an event. For example, if a group health plan is excepted from COBRA as a
small-employer plan during 1988 ... and an employee terminates employment on
December 31, 1988, the termination is not a qualifying event and the plan does not
have to permit the employee to elect COBRA continuation coverage. This is the case
even if the plan ceases to be a small-employer plan as of January 1, 1989.
Id.
42. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,730 (Q & A 40). A multiple qualifying event is one
which occurs during a period of COBRA eligibility, extending that period. The Proposed
Regulations illustrate a multiple qualifying event.
[I]f an employee covered by a group health plan that is subject to COBRA terminates
employment (for reasons other than gross misconduct) on December 31, 1987, the
termination is a qualifying event giving rise to a maximum coverage period that ex-
tends for 18 months to June 30, 1989. If the employee dies after the employee's
spouse and dependent children have elected COBRA continuation coverage and
before June 30, 1989, the spouse and the children (except anyone among them whose
COBRA coverage had already ended for some other reason) will be able to elect
COBRA continuation coverage through December 31, 1990.
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ployees and qualified beneficiaries. A COBRA notice obligation may arise in
four situations and can apply to employers, plan administrators, employees
and qualified beneficiaries.4 3
The initial obligation to inform employees and beneficiaries of their con-
tinuation coverage rights falls on the plan administrator. When COBRA
first applies to a group health plan and thereafter when an individual is origi-
nally covered by the plan, the plan administrator must notify each covered
employee as well as each covered employee's spouse, in writing, of his or her
COBRA rights.44 Additionally, the legislative history strongly suggests that
the Summary Plan Description (SPD) include an outline of COBRA
rights.45
Notice of an employee's death, termination, reduction of hours or Medi-
care eligibility must be made by the employer to the plan administrator no
later than thirty days following the day of that event if any of those events
causes a loss of coverage under the plan.4 6 Each covered employee or quali-
fied beneficiary is responsible for notifying the plan administrator of the oc-
currence of any divorce, legal separation or of a dependent child losing
dependency status under the plan within sixty days of the qualifying event.47
In turn, the plan administrator must give written notice of the right to CO-
BRA coverage to each employee and each qualified beneficiary within four-
teen days of receiving notification of the qualifying event.48
43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6) (West Supp. 1988);
42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-6 (West Supp. 1988); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 563, 567 (1985).
44. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(1) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6)(A); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300bb-6(l) (West Supp. 1988). For those plans already in existence at the time of COBRA's
effective date, this preliminary notice must be given at the time that the rules first apply to the
plan. COBRA §§ 10002(e) & 10003(c).
45. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 453, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 566 (1985). The Summary Plan De-
scription (SPD) is an ERISA-required written description of a benefit plan which must be
provided to participants and beneficiaries. The SPD must be in an easily understandable form,
include a statement of eligibility, coverage, employee rights and set forth the appeal procedure
which must be established to settle disputes arising under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1982).
46. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6)(B) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-6(2) (West Supp. 1988).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6)(C) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-6(3) (West Supp. 1988). Failure of the employee or qualified bene-
ficiary to provide notice of these qualifying events to the plan administrator within the sixty
day time period is cause for denying COBRA coverage. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,729
(Q & A 33).
48. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166 (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6)(D); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300bb-6(4) (West Supp. 1988). For purposes of COBRA notice requirements, any notice
properly given to the spouse of the employee is considered to be effective notice to any depen-
dent children that reside with that spouse. Interestingly enough, notice to the employee is not
considered constructive notice to dependent children residing with that employee. 29
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The Act provides sanctions for failures to give the required notice to em-
ployees and other qualified beneficiaries. A plan administrator who fails to
meet the notice requirements may be personally liable to the participant or
beneficiary for amounts up to $100 a day from the date of the failure or
refusal.49 These money penalties are limited to private sector administra-
tors. Recalcitrant state or local government employers are subject to equita-
ble sanctions.5°
VI. ELECTING COBRA COVERAGE
Each qualified beneficiary who would otherwise lose plan coverage be-
cause of a qualifying event must be given the opportunity to elect to continue
coverage. 51 An election by a covered employee or that employee's spouse to
continue coverage is deemed an election on behalf of any other qualified
beneficiary who would otherwise lose coverage as a consequence of the quali-
fying event. Therefore, an employee or spouse's election tolls the election
period, protecting the option of continuing coverage for all eligibles.52
While a qualified beneficiary who is a parent may elect continuing coverage
on behalf on his or her entire family, if eligible, each qualified beneficiary
retains the independent right to elect COBRA coverage in the event the em-
ployee and/or the spouse rejects the coverage. 53
U.S.C.A. § 1166(4)(B) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(6)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 1988);
42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-6(4) (West Supp. 1988).
49. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(c) (West Supp. 1988). Under ERISA, attorneys fees and costs
may be available to participants, beneficiaries and fiduciaries as litigants seeking to enforce
COBRA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1982); see also Iron Workers v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255
(5th Cir. 1980); Eaves v. Penn, 585 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978); Frary v. Shorr Paper Products,
Inc., 494 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Il. 1980).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-7 (West Supp. 1988).
51. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1161(a) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(1); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 300bb-l(a) (West Supp. 1988). 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,726 (Q & A 22).
52. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1165(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(5)(B) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-5(2) (West Supp. 1988).
53. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,729 (Q & A 37). This independent election right
also includes the entitlement to elect between "core" and whole-package coverage. Id. One
commentator has noted:
failure by the employee or spouse to make an election does not preclude an election
by another qualified beneficiary under the strict terms of the statutory language.
This requirement could result in 'split coverage' in many instances (e.g. where a di-
vorced spouse and children elect continuation coverage and the employee elects a
different coverage). It is not clear, however, that Congress intended such a result or
intended to give qualified beneficiaries any rights not previously possessed by the
covered employee. The regulations might reasonably provide, therefore, that covered
dependents residing with the employee should follow the election/nonelection of the
covered employee, on the theory that, in non-divorce situations, all that may be
elected or rejected is the package of coverage rights previously in effect.
Morgan, Continuation of Health Care Coverage, 31 TAX NOTES 1247, 1250-51 (1986). It ap-
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The election period may begin at any time, but must run at least sixty days
from the date the qualified beneficiary would otherwise lose plan coverage in
the absence of a COBRA election.54 The sixty day election period begins to
run from the later of the day coverage is terminated or sixty days following
receipt of the required notice outlining the right of election." An election
made at the end of the sixty day period may be applied retroactively to the
date when the qualified beneficiary lost coverage under the plan. The ability
of the qualified beneficiary to apply his decision retroactively will, of course,
allow some qualified beneficiaries to engage in "negative selection;" adopting
a wait and see approach, electing the coverage at the end of the period only if
he or she incurred a covered medical expense that exceeded the applicable
premium.56 A failure to make an election within the confines of the sixty
day election period, however, is an absolute bar to any COBRA
entitlement. 5
7
A qualified beneficiary may waive his or her election rights.58 A waiver of
COBRA rights given during the sixty day election period is subject to revo-
cation during that period, but, such a change of heart is not without conse-
quence. A qualified beneficiary who waives continuing coverage and then
revokes the waiver need not be provided with retroactive coverage.59 Such
an indecisive qualified beneficiary is entitled to coverage only from the date
of revocation.6'
VII. DURATION OF COBRA COVERAGE
COBRA coverage must be available for a minimum of eighteen months in
pears that the proposed regulations fail to address the issue of "split coverage" that Morgan
aptly describes is a likely occurrence when divorce is the antecedent to COBRA coverage and
dependent children are involved.
54. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1165(1) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(5)(A)(ii); 42
U.S.C.A. § 300bb-5(l) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,728 (Q & A 32).
55. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1165(l)(C) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(5)(A)(iii) (West
Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-5 (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,728
(Q & A 32). An election is deemed to be made on the date that it is sent to the employer or
plan administrator. Id.
56. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,729 (Q & A 34). Plans are not required to reim-
burse qualified beneficiaries for compensable medical services rendered during an election pe-
riod before an election is made, but, if an election is made in a timely manner, the plan must
make retroactive reimbursement to the qualified beneficiary. Id.; See also Morgan, supra note
53, at 1250 (1986).
57. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,728 (Q & A 32).
58. Id. at 22,729 (Q & A 35).
59. Id. Waivers and revocations of waivers are considered made on the date that they are
sent to the employer or plan administrator, as applicable.
60. Id.
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instances where the qualifying event is termination" or a reduction of hours
or thirty-six months when the qualifying event is the death of the covered
employee, divorce or legal separation of the covered employee from the cov-
ered employee's spouse, the covered employee's entitlement to Medicare
benefits or a dependent child losing dependency status under the terms of the
plan.6 2 The eighteen and thirty-six month periods of qualification begin to
run from the date of the qualifying event, even if coverage does not termi-
nate until some later date.6 3
There is only one instance where the original eighteen or thirty-six month
period of coverage can be expanded during the entitlement period. If, after a
termination of employment there is a second qualifying event such as the
divorce of the covered employee from his or her spouse, the affected qualified
beneficiary may opt to extend COBRA coverage to thirty-six months. 64
There are several circumstances where a qualified beneficiary may lose
COBRA continuation coverage prior to end of the period of entitlement.
These instances are:
(1) The qualified beneficiary fails to make a timely premium payment;
(2) The sponsoring employer terminates all of its group health plans;
(3) The qualified beneficiary becomes covered under another employer
sponsored group health plan as an employee, dependent or otherwise or;
(4) The qualified beneficiary becomes entitled to medicare benefits.65
In the event the qualified beneficiary exhausts the relevant maximum cov-
erage period, the group health plan must, during the 180 day period that
ends on that expiration date, provide the qualified beneficiary with an option
61. As noted earlier, termination for "gross misconduct" disqualifies an employee, his or
her covered spouse or dependents from receiving COBRA coverage. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1163(2) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,725 (Q & A 18). The lack of
any Labor Department regulations leaves this amorphous standard for disqualification unde-
fined. That the Congress chose such a tolerant standard for COBRA coverage in a termination
context clearly protects the COBRA rights of those employees discharged for a cause that falls
short of outrageous conduct.
62. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1163 (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(1) (West Supp. 1988);
42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-3 (West supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,730 (Q & A 38-
43).
63. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,730 (Q & A 41). For example, if the plan provides
extended coverage for those who would otherwise lose coverage as the result of the death of a
covered employee, that period of extended coverage may be credited against the thirty-six
month period of entitlement that COBRA otherwise provides. The Plan may, as an alternative
during the election period, offer qualified beneficiaries a choice between COBRA coverage and
some other type of continuation coverage, such as retiree coverage or state-law continuation
coverage. Id.
64. Id. (Q & A 40); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
65. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(B)(ii) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(2) (West Supp. 1988).
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of enrolling under a conversion health plan if such a right is offered to simi-
larly situated active employees under the plan.6 6 If such a conversion op-
tion is not generally available, the qualified beneficiary's right to opt for
coverage under the plan expires at the end of the COBRA period.6 7
VIII. THE TYPE OF CONTINUING HEALTH BENEFIT
COBRA MANDATES
As a general rule, a qualified beneficiary must have the right to purchase
the same kind of coverage he or she enjoyed immediately prior to the quali-
fying event.68 Moreover, if health benefit offerings for similarly situated ac-
tive employees are modified, these changes must also be made available to
COBRA beneficiaries. 69 Employers or plan administrators should be cau-
tious of the COBRA consequences visited on employers changing or elimi-
nating plans for similarly situated active employees. Any such change or
elimination in coverage entitles COBRA enrollees to the option of enrolling
in any other health plan maintained by the employer.70 These health bene-
fits must be offered at the same time and in the same manner as those en-
joyed by active employees. 7'
Of course, the Treasury Department was not satisfied by the relative sim-
plicity of the statutory language governing the type of benefit that must be
offered under COBRA. Consequently, the proposed regulations invent a dis-
tinction between "core" and "non-core" coverage.72
A qualified beneficiary who, immediately before the qualifying
event, is covered by a plan that provides both core coverage and
non-core coverage must be able to elect to receive either (1) the
coverage that he or she had immediately before the qualifying
event (including the core coverage and any non-core coverage), or
66. Id; 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,731 (Q & A 43).
67. Id.
68. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(l) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,726 (Q
& A 23).
69. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(l) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,726 (Q
& A 23).
70. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,726 (Q & A 23); S. Rep. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 365 (1985).
71. S. Rep. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1985).
72. There does not appear to be an iota of support for this distinction in the statute or
COBRA's legislative history. Therefore, it is perplexing that the Treasury Department took it
upon itself to legislate such a distinction. Accordingly, it will be no surprise if and when a
court strikes this agency-made distinction. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Herrington, 768 F.2d 1355, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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(2) the core coverage only.7 a
"Non-core coverage" is coverage for vision and dental benefits.74 "Core
coverage" is all of the other kinds of health coverage the qualified beneficiary
was receiving under the plan before the qualifying event.75 Qualified benefi-
ciaries may choose either core-only or non-core coverage, but if non-core
coverage is no more than five percent of the total cost of the coverage, the
plan need not provide the alternative of core coverage alone.76
IX. PAYING FOR COBRA COVERAGE
A. Paying the Premium
The availability of continuation coverage is contingent on the. qualified
beneficiary making a timely premium payment.77 While the premium must
be fixed for a twelve month period known as a "determination period," a
beneficiary must be allowed to pay for the coverage in either monthly, quar-
terly or semiannual installments.78
The qualified beneficiary must make his or her first payment within forty-
five days of his or her COBRA election.79 A premium payment is otherwise
timely for a period of COBRA coverage if it is made within thirty days after
the first day of the period.8" If covered employees or qualified beneficiaries
are permitted to make a later payment under the terms of the plan, so too
must COBRA eligibles.8"
B. Calculating the Cost
There should be no doubt that COBRA is not a publicly financed health
insurance scheme. As designed, COBRA requires those who elect COBRA
coverage to finance that benefit through premiums. Few appear to dispute
the notion that in drafting the cost provisions of COBRA, Congress failed to
apply much in the way of skilled legislative draftsmanship.82
This absence of precise statutory guidance, when coupled with the absence
73. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,726 (Q & A 24).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 29 U.S.C.A.'§ 1162(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(2)(C) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(3) (West Supp. 1988); 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,731 (Q
& A 44).
78. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,731 (Q & A 46).
79. Id. (Q & A 48).
80. Id. (Q & A 48(b)).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 53.
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of long-promised cost Treasury Regulations can create an administrative
nightmare for conscientious plan administrators who seek to fund COBRA
coverage in accordance with the law.83
In providing COBRA coverage, the plan may not charge more than 102
percent of the "applicable premium.",8 4 The "applicable premium" is the
cost to the plan for providing that kind of coverage under the plan during
the same time period to similarly situated beneficiaries.8 5 That the premium
a plan may charge is subject to a ceiling of two percent above cost does not,
it appears, preclude the plan from charging a smaller sum for COBRA
coverage.
The cost of the COBRA premium charged to any qualified beneficiary
must be determined by the plan in advance of the period of coverage. The
plan must make this cost determination for an entire twelve month "deter-
mination period" based on the cost to the plan for identical coverage of simi-
larly situated beneficiaries who are not eligible for COBRA coverage.86 The
statute directs that cost considerations necessary for determining the appro-
priate COBRA premium be made without regard to whether the employer
or the employee ordinarily absorbs the cost of coverage under the plan.87
Indeed, the legislative history indicates that qualified beneficiaries may be
charged for the entire cost of COBRA coverage even in the event the em-
ployer subsidizes that cost for similarly situated covered employees who
have not experienced a qualifying event. 8 "The amount to be charged for
the continuation coverage thus must be based on the ultimate net cost to the
83. Michael Thrasher, associate director of the Employee Benefits and Exempt Organiza-
tions Division of the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Chief Counsel, has indicated that the
agency is working on the cost provisions of regulations explaining COBRA continuation rules
and is encountering difficulty in defining, like may others, what is 102 percent of the "applica-
ble premium" that an employer may charge for that coverage. 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 885 (May
30, 1988). Efforts at drafting those regulations will not be completed in 1988. Id.
84. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1162(3)(A) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(2)(C) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-2(3) (West Supp. 1988).
85. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(1) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(A) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(l) (West Supp. 1988).
86. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C. § 162(k)(4)(C) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(3) (West Supp. 1988). The statute's language suggests that the
plan could vary the amount of the monthly premium charged within the twelve month deter-
mination period as long as the sum of such premium payments did not exceed the limit for that
determination period. Morgan, supra note 53, at 1254 (1986). The Proposed Regulations ap-
pear to follow that interpretation. See 52 Fed. Reg., supra note 17, at 22,731 (Q & A 45).
87. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(1) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(A) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(l) (West Supp. 1988); S. Rep. No. 146, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 365
(1985). Ordinarily, under a Taft-Hartley Health and Welfare Plan, the employer absorbs the
entire cost of the plan by making contributions to the plan in accordance with a formula set
out in the plan, fixed not actuarily but, through collective bargaining.
88. Id.
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employer (i.e. the premium cost less any dividends or any experience re-
bates)." 9 Some have argued that tying the COBRA premium to the cost
incurred by the employer is nonsensical, especially for many small-employer
plans.
The rule makes no sense within the context of a small employer
who has a straight forward insured health plan. In some years, the
cost to the plan would be astronomical if only one employee incurs
large expenses for a serious illness. In other years, the cost to the
plan would be de minimis if covered employees stayed healthy dur-
ing the year. In such a case, a more workable rule would define the
"applicable premium" as the premium charged by the insurance
company. It is hoped that regulations will adopt such an ap-
proach. Dividends or experience rebates (if any) could be paid to
the electing qualified beneficiary on the same basis as paid to the
employer under the plan.90
Self-insured plans are subject to special rules for determining the "applica-
ble premium" and recovering the cost the plan incurs to provide COBRA
coverage. 9 A self-insured plan may not charge an amount exceeding 102
percent of a "reasonable estimate" of the cost of providing coverage during
such a period for similarly situated beneficiaries. 92 While the statute man-
dates an actuarial assessment of cost, future Treasury Regulations will enu-
merate those factors which, when considered, will make the estimate of cost
"reasonable." 93
COBRA provides self-insured plans with an alternative scheme for calcu-
lating cost that is apparently designed to minimize the expense a smaller
plan might incur to hire an actuary and assess the cost of providing health
coverage on a prospective basis.94 This method allows the employer or plan
administrator to tie the COBRA premium to the cost incurred by the plan to
provide similar coverage during the preceding determination period, ad-
justed for inflation.95 This alternative method is unavailable for any plan
that experiences a significant change either in the coverage under or the em-
ployees covered by the plan between the determination period and any pre-
89. Morgan, supra note 53, at 1255.
90. Id.
91. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(2) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(B) (West Supp.
1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(2) (West Supp. 1988).
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164 (2)(A) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(B) (West
Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(2) (West Supp. 1988).
93. Id.
94. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(2)(B) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(3)(B)(ii) (West
Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-4(2)(B) (West Supp. 1988).
95. Id.
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ceding determination period.96
The requirement that the premium determination be made in advance of
the period of coverage creates substantial risks for the plan. Typically, in a
large group health plan, the benefit provider will not know the premium for
a plan year until after that year.97 The premium is tied to the number of
employees covered each month under the plan and this information, fre-
quently, cannot be compiled, communicated and analyzed until months after
the plan year ends.9"
One commentator implies that the difficulties rampant in discerning cost,
within the confines of an inartfully drafted statute and the absence of guiding
regulations, make the necessity of amending COBRA's continuing health
care provisions self-evident.99 The suggested remedy is to allow charges for
providing continuation contingent on the "cost to the plan for the coverage
of similarly situated individuals during the last period for which there are
complete cost data. '' "° This is a sensible approach. It makes the determina-
tion of cost fair and verifiable for both the recipient of the extended benefit
and the plan administrator whose primary responsibility under ERISA, it
must be remembered, is to deliver health insurance to employees and their
dependents. 101
The cost rules uniquely applicable to self-insured plans also pose practical
96. 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(2)(C) (West Supp. 1988); 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(B)(ii) (West
Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300bb-(2)(C) (West Supp. 1988). As noted earlier, the "determina-
tion period" is any period of twelve months for which a premium is fixed. The premium must
be fixed before the beginning of that period. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1164(3) (West Supp. 1988); 26
U.S.C.A. § 162(k)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1988); 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-4(3) (West Supp. 1988). It
appears that the determination period will, in most instances, be the plan year, but the statu-
tory language does not require coterminous periods. The statute does not make it clear
whether an employer or plan administrator may change a determination period in a subse-
quent year. As one commentator has noted:
Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates whether this is an annual
election, a one-time permanent election, or an election that can only be changed with
government approval. Employers making this election should be prepared for the
possibility that they will have to treat it as a permanent one.
Morgan, supra note 53 at 1254.
The Proposed Regulations issued by the Treasury Department require that the determina-
tion period not change from year to year. This is a common sense approach since it eliminates
the possibility that each qualified beneficiary might have distinct determination periods tied to
each individual anniversary date of entitlement to COBRA coverage. 52 Fed. Reg., supra note
17, at 22,731 (Q & A 45).
97. Morgan, supra note 53 at 1255.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1258.
100. Id. at 1255.
101. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982); Note, Employment Benefits Law, supra note 4, at
565-568.
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problems for plan administrators. A plan that follows the "reasonable esti-
mate" rule without the benefit of long-awaited regulations, chooses a path
fraught with risk. For example, if government estimates for inflation are set
at five percent, but medical costs follow current patterns and soar at a rate
far greater than other consumer items, the self-insured plan might be faced
with absorbing a significant portion of the cost of providing COBRA cover-
age. On the other hand, should the plan estimate inflation at higher levels
than are experienced, the plan sponsor may face substantial tax sanctions.' 2
X. FAILURE TO COMPLY: SANCTIONS
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, enacted in late
1988, amended COBRA and imposed sanctions on employees and other fi-
duciaries in instances where plans failed to provide continuing health care
coverage. 10 3 An excise tax equal to one hundred dollars a day up to two
hundred dollars a day per family may be imposed on employers and other
fiduciaries who fail to comply with COBRA."o The size of the penalty ulti-
mately depends on the number of beneficiaries deprived of coverage, the
number of occasions during a tax year when there are violations, whether
the employer knew of the failure and whether the failure is remedied.' 0 5
XI. CONCLUSION
COBRA opens the door to health care access for few of the forty or so
million Americans who lack basic health insurance. Indeed, there is some
evidence that those who are entitled to COBRA are not electing it in great
numbers.'0 6 Despite the shortcomings of COBRA, in particular its limited
scope, creating health care access as a mandated employment benefit is as
sound an approach to the needs of those who lack coverage as it was in
Harry Truman's day.
Health care access is more than a legal, medical or political question. It is
morally imperative. "Just remuneration" alone is an insufficient foundation
for the kind of moral employment relationship that is central to attaining a
just and enlightened society.'o 7
Man's life is built up every day from work, from work it derives its
102. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-647, - Stat. -
- (1988) (codified at IRC § 4980B).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 875 (1986).
107. See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, On Human Work, ENCYCLICAL LABOREM Ex-
ERCENS, (Sept. 14, 1984).
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specific dignity ... 18
A moral employment relationship provides for the health of workers and
their families. 109
Besides wages, various social benefits intended to ensure the life
and health of workers and their families play a part .... The ex-
penses involved in health care, especially in the case of accidents at
work, demand that medical assistance should be easily available for
workers and that as far as possible it should be cheap or even free
of charge.1 o
It is appropriate that the well-spring of human dignity, work itself, should
begin to bridge the divide that separates so many from basic health care.111
COBRA may not assure universal health care access, but it should be ap-
plauded as a step, albeit a hesitant step, in the right direction.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 45.
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id. at 3.
